I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in which better performance implies a higher payoff from winning. I characterize players' equilibrium payoffs in closed form, thereby generalizing Siegel's (2009) payoff result to contests in which players' utilities are non-monotonic.
Introduction
In some real-world competitions, better performance is not always associated with higher costs. For example, litigators, doctors, and professors often claim to enjoy their work (or parts of it). A contest that models a competition for promotions among such individuals would have the property that players' utilities increase in a certain range of effort. In other competitions for promotions, certain investments (such as acquiring technical or managerial skills) not only lead to better performance in the competition, but are also particularly useful to those promoted. Such investments may therefore increase the overall utility from winning, and decrease the utility from losing (because they are costly). Another example is a research and development race in which the firm with the highest-quality product enjoys a dominant market position. A better product is more costly to produce, but also results in higher sales, so that winning with a higher-quality product might lead to an increase in profits relative to winning with a lower-quality product. For a losing firm, however, the increase in sales associated with a better product may not be enough to offset its higher costs.
This note investigates a complete-information contest model that can capture these phenomena, and accommodates many players, multiple identical prizes, general asymmetries, and a combination of unconditional and conditional investments. In a contest, each player chooses a score, and the players with the highest scores win one prize each. Each player is characterized by two functions of his score, one describing his utility when he wins and the other describing his utility when he loses. These functions need not be monotonic, so that, conditional on winning or losing, better performance does necessarily imply a lower utility. When all players' utility functions are weakly decreasing, the model coincides with that of Siegel (2009) . 1 His main result is that each player's equilibrium payoff is the highest payoff he can guarantee himself when the other players do not employ strictly-dominated strategies.
Theorem 1 shows that Siegel's (2009) payoff characterization holds (essentially) without change even when players' utilities are not monotonic. At first blush, this may seem like a trivial observation. A player will never choose a score for which there exists a higher score that delivers a higher utility. Therefore, if a player's utility function is non-monotonic, simply replace it with the monotonic function that assigns to each score the highest utility achievable at weakly higher scores, and apply Siegel's (2009) payoff characterization to the modified contest. Any equilibrium of the original contest would be an equilibrium of the 1 The assumption of weakly decreasing utility is common in the contest literature. Exceptions are Amegashie (2001) and Chowdhury (2009) , who have examined specific non-monotonicities in the context of a two-player all-pay auction.
modified contest, and players' payoffs in such an equilibrium would be the same in both contests. One case in which this approach works is when the value of winning relative to losing is independent of the player's score (the contest would then be "separable" in the language of Siegel (2009)). This happens, for example, in a competition for promotions with intrinsically motivated workers when the value associated with a promotion is independent of the amount of effort put in by the workers.
The problem with this approach is that each player is characterized by two utility functions, and in some contests there may be regions of score in which one utility function increases while the other decreases. For example, in the research and development race described above, the quality of a product affects sales more significantly for a winner than for a loser, so that for some range of scores in the corresponding contest players' utilities increase when they win and decrease when they lose. Consequently, in equilibrium players may choose scores for which their utilities in the original and modified contests differ 
An Example
Consider a two-player symmetric contest in which each player chooses a non-negative score, and the player with the higher score wins (ties are broken randomly). Winning with a score of x gives a payoff of (1 + x) /2 if x ≤ 1 and 2 − x if x > 1, and losing with a score of x gives a payoff of −x. This contest corresponds to the research and development scenario described above: players' valuations for winning first increase and then decrease, but their costs of losing monotonically decrease.
The highest score that is not strictly dominated is 2, and each player can guarantee himself at most 0 when the other player chooses scores no higher than 2. 
is an equilibrium of the contest. This is not an equilibrium, however, of the modified contest in which each player's payoff when he wins with a score of x is 1 if x ≤ 1 and 2 − x if x > 1 (i.e., the highest payoff he can obtain in the original contest by winning with a weakly higher score).
Model
As in Siegel (2009), a contest is a strategic game in which n players compete for m identical prizes, 0 < m < n. The set of players {1, . . . , n} is denoted by N. Every player i chooses a
where v i : S i → R is player i's valuation for winning, c i : S i → R is player i's cost of losing, and P i : × j∈N S j → [0, 1] is player i's probability of winning, which satisfies
1 if s j < s i for n − m or more players j 6 = i, and P j∈N P j (s) = m. The primitives of the contest are commonly known. For example, in Section 1.1 we have
, and
I depart from Siegel (2009) by not requiring that v i and c i be monotonic. Formally, I
replace Assumptions A1-A3 in Siegel (2009) with the following, more general Assumptions D1-D3 (which are implied by Assumptions A1-A3).
D1 v i and c i are continuous.
D2 −c i (s i ) = l i for some s i ≥ a i , and for some M > a i , 
Assumptions D2 and D3 formalize the requirement that at any score that is not strictly dominated, winning is better than losing. The idea is, for each player i, to divide the set of scores into two consecutive intervals, [0, r i ] and (r i , ∞), such that the value of v 
, then for any y < x and x 0 ∈ (y, x)
, so left continuity at x follows from continuity of v i . For Definitions (i) Player i's reach r i is the highest score at which his valuation for winning is
Re-index players in (any) decreasing order of their reach, so r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ . . . ≥ r n .
(ii) Player m + 1 is the marginal player.
(iii) The threshold T of the contest is the reach of the marginal player: T = r m+1 .
(iv) Players i's power w i is the highest payoff he can obtain by winning at a score no lower than the threshold. That is,
In particular, the marginal player's power is v m+1 (r m+1 ) = l m+1 .
For example, in Section 1.1 we have l 1 = l 2 = 0, and r 1 = r 2 = T = 2.
Generic Conditions (i) Power Condition -The marginal player is the only player i for whom w i = l i . (ii) Cost Condition -The marginal player's valuation for winning is strictly decreasing at the threshold, i.e., for some ε > 0 and every x ∈ (T − ε, T ), v m+1 (x) > v m+1 (T ) = l m+1 . I refer to a contest that meets the Generic Conditions as a generic contest. In a generic contest, for every player i < m + 1 we have w i > l i , and for every player i > m + 1 we have w i < l i . 4 Let N W = {1, . . . m} and N L = {m + 1, . . . , n}.
An equilibrium is a profile of mixed strategies (probability distributions), one for each player, such that each player's mixed strategy assigns probability 1 to the player's set of best responses to the other player's mixed strategies. 5 The modified payoff characterization is as follows. Proof of Theorem 1. Choose a generic contest and an equilibrium G = (G 1 , . . . , G n ) of the contest, where G i (x) is the probability that player i chooses a score no higher than x..
Least Lemma
Every player i's expected payoff in G is at least the maximum of his power and l i .
Proof. Every player i can guarantee himself a payoff of l i by choosing a score s i for which
5 The proof of Corollary 1 in Siegel (2009), which applies here, shows that an equilibrium exists.
It therefore suffices to consider players i for whom w i > l i , all of whom are in N W . 7 In equilibrium, no player i chooses scores higher than r i with a strictly positive probability, since choosing such scores leads to a payoff lower than l i . 8 Therefore, for any ε > 0 the n − m players in N L choose scores lower than T + ε with certainty, so any other player i can win with certainty by choosing max {a i , T + ε}. This implies, by continuity of
, that the payoff of every player i in N W is no less than
Tie Lemma Suppose that in G two or more players have an atom at a score x, i.e., in N W chooses scores that approach or exceed the threshold, i.e., has G i (x) < 1 for every x < T . Otherwise, for some s in (s sup , T ), G i (s) = 1 for all but at most m − 1 players in N\ {m + 1}. But then the marginal player could win with certainty by choosing any score in (max {a m+1 , s} , T ) (note that a m+1 < T); because of the Cost Condition, this would give him a payoff strictly above l m+1 , a contradiction (recall that the marginal player is in N L and therefore has an expected payoff of l m+1 ).
Take a player i in N W . Because G i (x) < 1 for every x < T , there exists a sequence {x n } ∞ n=1 of best responses for player i that approach some z i ≥ T . Since x n is a best response for player i, whose payoff is strictly above l i by the Least Lemma and the Power Condition, Assumption D3 shows that v i (x n ) > −c i (x n ). By continuity of v i , player i's payoff is
so every player in N W obtains at most his power.
The Least Lemma and the Threshold Lemma show that players in N W have expected payoffs equal to their power. We have seen that every player i in N L has an expected payoff of l i . Since N L ∪ N W = N, the expected payoff of every player i equals the maximum of his power and l i .
Contests with Two Players
In a two-player contest, Theorem 1 holds even if the Power Condition fails, as long as the Cost Condition holds for every player i with w i = l i (this is the case in Section 1.1). To see this, suppose that the Power Condition does not hold, which implies that the Cost Condition holds for both players. Recall that the Least Lemma, the Tie Lemma, and the Zero Lemma do not rely on the Generic Conditions. By the Zero Lemma, some player j has a payoff of l j . This implies that the other player i 6 = j has best responses {x n } ∞ n=1 that approach or exceed the threshold. Otherwise, as in the proof of the Threshold Lemma, player j could win by choosing a score slightly below the threshold, which, by the Cost Condition, would give him a payoff higher than l j . The Least Lemma and (1) now imply that player i has a payoff of w i = l i .
